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Abstract
The paper addresses the question of how different types of evidence
ought to inform public health policy. By analysing causal studies on
obesity, the paper draws lessons about the different roles that different
types of evidence play in setting up public health policies. More specif-
ically, it is argued that ‘difference-making’ evidence supports consider-
ations about ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’, and that
‘mechanistic evidence’ provides information about the ‘causal pathways’
to intervene upon.
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1 The fat generation in the era of ‘evidence’
Health is a concern for particular individuals as well as for policy makers. My
interest in this paper goes to the worries of policy makers, who are committed to
find effective ways to improve health of populations. No wonder public health
policy is utterly concerned with questions about evidence, that is with ques-
tions about the very basis of public health interventions. There are of course
a plethora of issues looming here; in this paper I shall restrict the discussion
to the roles that different types of evidence ought to play in setting up public
health policies. Studies on obesity are exemplar, as we shall see, in exhibiting
the complexity of the quarrels about policy, evidence and causation; at the same
time, these studies also provide fruitful insights to answer questions about evi-
dence and causation in the public health policy debate. Let me then open the
paper with an outlook of the studies on obesity.
Obesity is a chronic disease. The prevalence of obesity—i.e., its percentage
with the respect to the total population—is increasing in many countries and
at different ages. Interest in obesity is not in its being a new disease, as obese
people existed in the past too, but rather in the fact that the number of obese
people is growing, and very fast.
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In more and more Member States of the European Union, over 20% of the
adult population is obese, over 50% of the adult population is overweight, and
up to 20% of children are overweight.1
Figures show that obesity is now an epidemic. Evidence collected in nu-
merous studies shows that diseases related to excess adipose tissue—e.g., car-
diovascular diseases—have drastically increased. Moreover, those diseases are
amongst the most significant factors of morbidity and mortality worldwide; the
contention of those studies is that, ultimately, prevalence in obesity and its
associated comorbidites is likely to continue to increase in the near future.
The question easily arises: how to explain such an increase in the percentage
of obese people? There are, broadly speaking, two main factors: biological and
genetic factors on the one hand, and nutrition and lifestyle on the other hand.
These two broad categories of factors correspond to two perspectives on the
disease: biological and socio-economic. Not only there exist different perspec-
tives on the disease, but also different ways in which different people involved—
overweight people, health professional, policy makers—perceive the problem
(see e.g. Greener et al. (2010); Galea et al. (2010)).
Also, in understanding obesity, there seem to be two distinct albeit related
questions at stake: (i) what are the causes of obesity and (ii) what are the causes
of the increase of prevalence obesity. Whilst the first question is concerned with
having a thorough understanding of the disease, it is in fact the second that is
most relevant for public health purposes.
It may be argued that the action taken in response to the second question
above, also depends on the answers given to the first question. In other words,
the better our understanding of the disease and of its development, the better
our actions to reduce its burden on population. Nevertheless, this is easier
said than done. It is in fact the complexity of disease causation in this case that
makes interventions so hard to put in place. Research suggests that most human
obesity probably reflects complex interactions between genetic, environmental,
and social factors often mediated through nongenetically derived changes in
metabolism. The phenomenon is so complex that some are suggesting computer
simulation through the so-called ‘agent-based models’ to get a better grip on it
(see e.g. Galea et al. (2010))
An interesting aspect of obesity is that both ‘health’ and ‘economic’ consid-
erations motivate public health intervention. I mentioned earlier consequences
on health such as cardiovascular problems. But there are consequences other
than health: standard seat width increased, office furniture, revolving doors,
average passengers weight implications for fuel used by airlines, all equipment
in hospitals (bed, wheelchairs, operating tables, etc). We thus want to reduce
obesity rates for its effects on health, but not only.
There are already a number of public health interventions in place to re-
duce obesity. For instance, the MEND programme2 proved to be successful in
reducing obesity. Established in 2004, MEND aims to teach children and their
1This data refers to statistics published on open access websites and data bases of
the European Commission, the UK National Health Services, and the World Health Or-
ganisation, all accessed in March 2010 (http://www.hopeproject.eu/index.php?nav_id=;
http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/health-and-lifestyles/
obesity/statistics-on-obesity-physical-activity-and-diet-england-2010; http:
//www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/index.html)
2Information about the programme, the services, the follow-up, related scientific publica-
tions, etc. can be found at the sable URL=http://www.mendprogramme.org/home.
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families how to live healthier. By targeting children in the age ranges of 2–4, 5–
7, and 7–13, MEND programmes also target the parents of obese children thus
aiming to positively change their and the children’s habits about nutrition and
lifestyle. Likewise, there are around a number of interventions and campaigns
sponsored by different national health services and by the European Commis-
sion in order to induce changes in dietary habits and consequently to reduce
obesity.
Ultimately, the difficulty is to decide what policies will be effective, and for
whom. In other words, two issues are at stake here:
(i) What factors—i.e., biological/genetic or social—to intervene upon to re-
duce obesity.
(ii) Who should take part in public health policies to reduce obesity what level
to target the intervention: children, adults, poor people, . . .
Thus, the question arises: what evidence ought to inform public health pol-
icy? The answer I will give is that two types of evidence broadly conceived ought
to inform public health policy: difference-making and mechanistic. Whilst the
former supports considerations about ‘what works for whom and in what cir-
cumstances’, the latter provides information about the ‘causal pathways’ to
intervene upon. The argument will run in three steps.
Section 2 states the importance of epidemiology for public health because
of its population-level perspective on disease causation. It is then argued that
in epidemiology (and in medicine more generally) causal assessment requires
evidence of two types: difference-making and mechanistic. Arguments in favour
of this thesis can be also found in Russo (2009, 2011); Russo and Williamson
(2007, 2011).
Section 3 praises the efforts of public health practitioners to address ques-
tions of evidence. It is argued that although they work towards developing cri-
teria for evidence assessment, the most crucial question, that is what evidence
is needed for public health policy, is by and large left unanswered.
Section 4 provocatively pleads for causally-based public health on the grounds
that a better understanding of disease causation will result in better actions and
decision. Thus, if we accept the idea that disease causation requires two types
of evidence—difference-making and mechanistic—so does public health policy.
Difference-making evidence, mainly in the form of risks coming from descriptive
epidemiology, supports considerations about ‘what works for whom in what cir-
cumstances’. Mechanistic evidence, mainly coming from analytic epidemiology,
cashes out the ‘causal pathways’ upon which we have to intervene. In sum,
these different types of evidence serve different roles in deciding about public
health policy.
2 Public health and epidemiology
Public health aims to preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting health
of populations. A first peculiar characteristic of public health is that actions
to reach those aims are based on population-level analyses. Thus, public health
is concerned with preventive rather than curative and individual-level interven-
tions; individual-level measures are in fact a concern of medicine (and, within
the broad evidence-based perspective, a concern of evidence-based medicine).
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A second characteristic of public health, as practitioners notice, is its inter-
disciplinarity. The decisions about what actions to undertake rely on findings
in other areas, such as epidemiology, biostatistics, behavioural sciences, health
economics and and health care management. Given the population-level dimen-
sion of public health, I am most concerned with the importance of epidemiology,
for reasons that will become clear throughout the discussion.
Epidemiology studies how the distributions of diseases and their biological
and socio-economic determinants vary within a population and across different
populations. This happens in two, typically subsequent, kinds of analyses: de-
scriptive and analytic epidemiology. On the one hand, descriptive epidemiology
seeks to answer questions about ‘who’ in the population is affected by ‘what’
disease and under what circumstances (‘when’ and ‘where’). The main goal of
descriptive epidemiology is thus to work out risks of disease and exposure for
a given population. On the other hand, analytic epidemiology seeks to answer
questions of ‘how’ the disease operates and ‘why’ it develops and spreads. The
main focus of analytic epidemiology are measures of associations from which
to draw inferences about the causes of disease. Thus, analytic epidemiology
is certainly more ‘causally-oriented’ than descriptive epidemiology. The causal
character of analytic epidemiology is not always made explicit (see e.g. Porta
(2008)). Nevertheless, in asking how and why questions, analytic epidemiol-
ogy clearly goes beyond the mere measurement of associations and evaluates
mechanistic explanatory hypotheses.
Here is an example. Constantin et al. (2010) are interested in measuring
associations between leptin G-2548A and leptin receptor Q223R gene polymor-
phisms; yet, the motivation is to test mechanistic hypotheses. In the quote
below I have highlighted in bold in the mechanistic hypotheses that the epi-
demiologists aim to test, and I have italicised the corresponding associations
that they measure in order to test it.
Obesity arises from a complex interaction between genetic variance,
environment, and lifestyle changes. Obesity is one of the most chal-
lenging health problems of the last century with a tremendous in-
crease in the prevalence, considered to be an important risk factor
for type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular diseases.
Leptin, the obese (ob) gene product acts to reduce food in-
take and to increase energy expenditure, and plays an impor-
tant role both in the development of obesity and in insulin secretion.
Leptin exerts its pleiotropic actions directly through dis-
tinct receptors (Ob-R) encoded by the diabetes (db) gene.
In humans, LEP and LEPR have been mapped to 7q31.3 and 1p31,
respectively. The long form of leptin receptor OB-Rb is thought to
be essential in leptins weight-reducing effects through the hypotha-
lamus and.
Serum leptin level is significantly increased in obese persons and is
proportionally with body adiposity. In type 2 diabetes leptin levels
have been reported to be either unchanged or reduced.
The leptin (LEP) and leptin receptor (LEPR) genes have been in-
vestigated in the search for gene variants potentially related to the
pathophysiology of obesity, diabetes and its associated complica-
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tions. A leptin gene SNP consisting in G to A substitution at nu-
cleotide (nt) -2548 upstream of the ATG start site in the LEP gene
promoter, LEP G-2548A, has been associated with adipocytes in-
creased leptin production and secretion. Interestingly, as for LEPR
gene polymorphism, the A to G transition in exon 6 at nt 668 from
the start codon 223 (Q223R) was associated with impaired leptin-
binding activity. The LEPR Q223R polymorphism has been asso-
ciated with body mass index (BMI), fat mass, leptin levels, and
systolic and diastolic blood pressure. There are few studies dealing
with the association between LEP G-2548A and LEPR Q223R poly-
morphisms, type 2 diabetes, and obesity status. Thus, in the Chi-
nese population, LEP -G2548A showed a positive correlation with
incidence of type 2 diabetes. Recently, it was reported that LEPR
Q223R polymorphism has been associated with impaired glucose
tolerance and conversion to type 2 diabetes, and insulin resistance.
The aim of this study was to investigate whether two common sin-
gle nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in the leptin ( LEP G-2548A)
gene and its receptor ( LEPR Q223R) gene are related to obesity in
a sample of urban Romanian population. Also, the influence of the
LEP G-2548A and the LEPR Q223R polymorphisms on the vari-
ability of metabolic phenotypes (anthropometric variables, glucose,
insulin and leptin concentration, and lipid profile) was investigated.
Although analytic epidemiology does not state in such clear terms that the
stake is the evaluation of mechanistic hypotheses, it is hard to think of answers
to ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions that are not causal and mechanistic. In address-
ing the ‘why’ question, analytic epidemiology must be looking for the causes
of disease, rather than mere associations between risk factors or exposure and
disease. To say it with Wesley Salmon, successful explanations are those that
put “the cause into because” (Salmon, 1984). As for the ‘how’ question, here a
satisfactory answer must consider the functioning of, or the modes of organisa-
tion and interaction within, the phenomenon being analysed. This is the core
idea behind mechanistic explanations, which is defended, in slightly different
ways both by scholars in the ‘mainstream’ literature on mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005)) and by scholars interested in the explanatory
import of models in social science (see, e.g., Mouchart and Russo (2010)).
As mentioned above, epidemiology is perhaps the main source of information
for public health. Yet, it is worth noting that the public health dimension of
epidemiology is a matter of controversy amongst epidemiologists themselves.
Although many share the view that epidemiology underpins public health, there
is still a wide gap between public health practice and academic epidemiology
(on this point see for instance Bophal (1997, 1999) and references therein).
Research in epidemiology is arguably driven by two distinct but nonetheless
complementary goals: (i) to understand and learn about disease and (ii) to take
action in order to reduce the burden of disease at the population level. This
second, more controversial goal will be thoroughly discussed in §3. Let us focus
now on the first one. Understanding and learning about disease consists in
drawing conclusions from evidence, more particularly conclusions about disease
causation. Therefore, epidemiology brings to the fore questions about what
evidence is needed to draw conclusions about disease causation.
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We have seen in §1 that epidemiological studies on obesity aim to reach a
comprehensive understanding of the disease. This is done by seeking answers
to questions about ‘who-what-when-where’, identifying the relevant risk factors,
viz. by making considerations about difference-making, and by seeking answers
to the ‘how-why’ questions which are about mechanisms. This thesis—that
causal assessment typically needs difference-making and mechanistic evidence—
has been defended for the health sciences in general and for causal inference in
epidemiology and autopsy in particular by Russo (2009, 2011) and by Russo
and Williamson (2007, 2011). I will not reiterate the arguments already given
in favour of the thesis. Instead, in §3 I defend the idea that the two types of
evidence are also needed for public health purposes.
Let me give a scent of what these two types of evidence amount to. Simply
put, difference-making evidence is evidence that a putative causal factor ‘makes
a difference’ to the putative effect. In other words, difference-making evidence
helps deciding whether the putative causal factor is relevant for the occurrence
of the putative effect. This type of evidence can be cashed out in different
forms: probabilistic, statistical, or counterfactual relations. Difference-making
evidence is especially needed for description and for prediction of disease causa-
tion. Mechanistic evidence is about a plausible or confirmed enough mechanisms
that are meant, in turn, to support results of difference-making. Mechanistic
evidence is especially needed for explanation and control. The characterisation
hereby offered is very general and the interested reader may want to have a look
at Gillies (2010) and Illari (2010) for a critical discussion.
3 Evidence-based public health
Consider now the second goal of epidemiology mentioned above, i.e. taking
action in order to reduce the burden of disease. Although some epidemiologists
do think that this is their concern too, in the last years public health has worked
towards establishing itself as an autonomous scientific domain (with respect to
the many other disciplines that inform public health policy) within the so-called
evidence-based movement.
One motivation to embrace the evidence-based framework is to provide de-
cisions and actions with a stronger basis. For instance, Brownson et al. (1999,
p.87) notice that
[i]deally, public health practitioners always incorporate scientific ev-
idence in making management decisions, developing policies, and
implementing programs. However, in reality, these decisions often
are based on short-term demands rather than long-term study, and
policies and programs are developed frequently around anecdotal
evidence.
Consequently, the advent of evidence-based public health is certainly wel-
come. But, at the same time, evidence-based public health (EBPH) brings to
the fore specific questions about the basis upon which policy ought to be based,
and, moreover, it inherits from epidemiology crucial questions about evidence
and causal assessment. This can be extracted from the way EBPH theorists
define their own discipline. We read, for instance:
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Evidence-based public health is defined as the development, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of effective programs and policies in pub-
lic health through application of principles of scientific reasoning,
including systematic uses of data and information systems, and ap-
propriate use of behavioral science theory and program. (Brownson
et al., 2003)
Evidence-based public health is the process involved in providing the
best available evidence to influence decisions about the effectiveness
of policies and interventions and secure improvements in health and
reductions in health inequalities. (Killoran and Kelly, 2010, p. xxii)
From the quotes above it emerges that the main concern of EBPH is to
provide a solid, scientific basis for the decisions and actions taken to reduce the
burden of disease. Multiple sources of evidence are said to be necessary to this
end.
Indeed, the focus on evidence concerns many aspects (Guyatt and Drum-
mond, 2002): what evidence one’s practice or policy is based upon, the sound-
ness of evidence, the strength of inference permitted by evidence, etc. Put it in
more general terms, what is key is the assessment of evidence.3
There is a broad consensus that assessing scientific evidence involves evalu-
ating peer review publications by conducting meta-analyses in order to minimise
problems of bias and to decide about the quality and generalisability of studies.
Evidence assessment is also usually taken to involve quantitative risk assess-
ment, economic evaluation of the prospective interventions, and consultations
with expert panels. Brownson et al. (2003, ch. 2), a classic in EBPH, explic-
itly mention issues related to causality. They start with the usual caveat that
causality is almost impossible to establish with certainty; they then discuss well-
known criteria and guidelines used in the health sciences such as Henle-Koch
postulates and Bradford Hill’s guidelines. They also review pioneering and in-
fluential methods put forward by a number of accounts of epidemiologists that
overtly embraced a causalist perspective (most famously, Rothman’s ‘pie’ and
Susser’s ‘Chinese boxes’). However, according to Brownson et al. (2003), causal
issues are eventually resolved by following Hill’s guidelines. No more, no less.
It is worth emphasising that the worries of evidence-based practitioners con-
cern the best evidence to license inference and action. However, in the discus-
sions about how to assess what evidence is best, a clear statement about what is
the evidence that undergoes assessment is missing. This is the point I am most
concerned with. Even if we agree that Hill’s guidelines provide a comprehensive
enough list for causal assessment, we need to make clear what these guidelines
help us assessing.
Granted, there is an effort in providing a positive, more specific account of
what evidence is to undergo evaluation for public health purposes. Notably,
some EBPH practitioners distinguish between Type I and Type II evidence.
Type I evidence points to a particular health condition for which some pre-
ventable risk factors have been identified. Such evidence tells that something
3It goes without saying that, when discussing policy, questions about what ethical principles
and values ought to guide interventions inevitably come up. Those are certainly important.
However, I want to focus here on a theoretical issue, namely on the theoretical issue of what
constitutes evidence for policy in public health contexts.
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must be done. Type II evidence points to specific interventions that proved to
be relatively efficacious in order to improve a particular health condition. Such
evidence tells that this particularly must be done. The evaluation of either type
of evidence is done through systematic reviews of findings in well-conducted
studies, especially with attention to their internal and external validity (Brown-
son et al., 1999). This brings us straight onto the next point about evidence
assessment.
EBPH theorists, just like EBM theorists, oft appeal to the so-called ‘evi-
dence hierarchy’ and claim that the best evidence comes from randomized clin-
ical trials—to be sure, from systematic reviews of several RCTs. There are a
number of arguments that may be developed against this claim or against the
‘received’ hierarchy altogether. I will not endorse this line of argument here,
though. I just want to flag the issue and report that critical views come from the
scientific community itself, not just the philosophical community. For instance,
Rychetnik et al. (2004) admit that RCTs are important for causal assessment
but make the point that the complexity of public health requires that RCTs
be accompanied by other forms of causal assessment, e.g. observational studies
using adequacy or plausibility design. Likewise, Glasziou et al. (2007) make
the point that sound causal conclusions may be reached through observational
methods too; consequently RCTs are mistakenly considered the gold standard
of causal inference. However, as I said, I will not pursue this line argument here.
In spite of the valuable attempts to give evidence assessment the shape,
the evidence hierarchy—just like the distinction between Type I and Type II
evidence—leaves largely unanswered the question of what evidence is in fact
needed for policy.
To be sure, this is a concern shared by theorists of EBPH too. Witness for
instance Rychetnik et al. (2004, p. 538):
In the broadest sense, evidence can be defined as “facts or testimony
in support of a conclusion, statement or belief”4. Such a generic
definition is a useful starting point, but it is devoid of context and
does not specify what counts as evidence, when, and for whom.
What evidence be needed for policy is likewise left unspecified in official
documents of agencies such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)5.
Consider for instance the “Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims
made on foods”6. The first chapter of the document provides precise definitions
of the terms that will be subsequently used, such as ‘nutrient’, ‘health claim’,
‘reduction of disease risk claim’ etc. Throughout the document we are repeat-
edly told that evaluation of foods is made on the basis of scientific evidence,
and yet, evidence is never defined.
A charitable interpretation would be that what is meant by evidence in this
context is exactly the evidence discussed in scientific publications of evidence-
based public health theorists, as the ones mentioned above. If this is the case,
4Trumble W.R., Stevenson A. (eds), Shorter Oxford English dictionary on historical prin-
ciples, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
5Information about EFSA, its goals, organisation, documents, campaign and events can
be retrieved from its portal, URL=http://www.efsa.europa.eu/.
6The document may be accessed at the following stable URL=http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:404:0009:0025:EN:PDF.
8
I contend that Type I and Type II evidence nor the evidence hierarchy answer
the question of what evidence is needed for public health in a satisfactory way.
Moreover, what is left unanswered is what roles different types of evidence serve
in making policy decisions. This, I shall examine next.
4 Causally-based public health
4.1 Understanding and acting: causally-based scientific
practices
Let the following idea guide the arguments below. As a general rule, making
good decisions and taking good actions depend on having a good understanding
of the phenomenon or situation. To be more specific about public health poli-
cies, the better our understanding of the disease, the better too the interventions
to reduce the burden of disease. Thus, if we accept the idea that understanding
disease causation involves making considerations about different types of evi-
dence (see §2), then those different types of evidence should feed the design of
public health policies too.
Killoran and Kelly (2010, p. xxii-xxiii) make a list of what they take to be
the key features of EBPH. Two of them, in particular, matter for the present
discussion. One is “conceptual plausibility: an understanding of causal path-
ways defining the factors influencing health and the potential for intervention”;
the other is “use of different types of evidence to determine what works for
whom in what circumstances”.
This patently brings upfront in the discussion of evidence-based public health
causal questions of the type I mentioned at the end of §2, namely what kinds
of evidence are typically involved in causal assessment. I argue below that
mechanistic evidence cashes out Killoran and Kelly’s ‘causal pathways’ and
difference-making backs up their ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’.
Thus, this section provocatively pleads for the idea that public health policy
should be causally-based, not just evidence-based. Some may immediately rebut
that causality is too strong a requirement for policy. Not only this is an area
where a good grip on causal relations is rarely obtained; moreover, as a matter
of fact, decisions and actions are normally based on sole knowledge of risk
factors and their strength. To this it may be counterargued that to intervene on
factors that are not the causes of disease would eventually turn out to be useless.
Consequently, to ensure (as much as possible) that policies are effective, we have
to intervene on the causes of disease, not on factors merely associated to the
disease. Moreover, even if it is common practice to design public health policies
on the mere basis of risks, this is bad practice notwithstanding their strength.
I explain below why evidence of mechanisms, beside difference-making evidence
cashed out in the form of risks, offers a more solid basis to public health policy.
Concerns about the relations between evidence and policy have been also
raised by Nancy Cartwright. Cartwright (2009) argues that causal knowledge is
valuable for policy and planning. In particular, she is interested in the connec-
tion between causal knowledge and the ability to predict results of manipulations
or interventions. To this end, what is most relevant, according to Cartwright,
is whether ‘invariance’ and ‘modularity’ are able to deliver causal relations, as
many people believe. In fact, invariance (i.e., that model parameters exhibit
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some kind of stability across changes of environments or interventions) and
modularity (i.e., that we can intervene on one factor to see its effects without
affecting the whole system) are usually taken to be the fundamental characteris-
tics that allow structural models (i.e., the models customarily used in economics
and econometrics) to correctly represent causal relations.
Whilst I am concerned with the general problem of the types of evidence to
establish whether a relation is causal, Cartwright, as I see it, is more particularly
concerned with the assessment of difference-making evidence, cashed out in
terms of invariance and modularity in structural models.
But Cartwright (2008) is also concerned with what claims are relevant for
policy and, she argues, the relevant claims are causal claims. It is along those
lines of reasoning that I will next make the case for the claim that the two types
of evidence involved in causal assessment ought also to be involved in public
health policy, because of the specific role each serves.
It is worth making clear that the normative claim is that difference-making
and mechanistic evidence should explicitly enter EBPH guidelines, such as the
ones of the European Food Safety Authority mentioned earlier. On the one
hand, it is a matter of fact that theses two types of evidence are, one way
or another, already used by EBPH practitioners, albeit just implicitly. On
the other hand, it is also a matter of fact that these two types of evidence
are not explicitly mentioned in various EBPH guidelines (textbooks or official
documents of various agencies). Notice, though, that I am not claiming that no
action is possible without detailed evidence of each of the two types. Rather,
my point is that better action can be planned if those are explicitly taken into
account, as much as possible and subject to their availability. There certainly
are situations in which some decision must be taken even in absence of full
evidence (most typically, in absence of good mechanistic evidence). It does not
follow, though, that research to collect further (mechanistic) evidence is not
needed anymore.
4.2 Difference-making and mechanistic evidence
In this section it is argued that public health policy needs back up coming from
two types of evidence broadly conceived—difference-making and mechanistic—
each serving a specific role in public health policy.
Difference-making evidence Public health policy needs information coming
from difference-making evidence. Difference-making evidence may be in the
form of e.g. statistical relevance relations, probabilistic dependencies, risks. This
is typically provided by descriptive epidemiology, which answers questions about
who, what, when, where.
Such information is helpful in deciding whether policy interventions have to
target the whole population (e.g., in food labelling), or only subgroups (e.g.,
families as in the MEND) or individuals (e.g., in MEND there is also the possi-
bility to report an obese child) that fall under certain categories. On a different
level, difference-making evidence may also help in deciding whether it is more
efficient to intervene on the social or biological factors of disease (or on both
simultaneously).
Thus, the role of difference-making evidence is to back up considerations
about what works for whom in what circumstances. Part of the job is to make
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it plausible that what worked for some population will also work in another one
based, by and large, on arguments by analogy.7 Such information is collected,
for instance, by local and national cancer registers or in obesity databases.8
There are also a number of research projects promoted by the Executive Agency
for Health and Consumers.9 Although those projects are listed under policy
actions, they are in fact highly exploratory, in that they are meant to provide
relevant difference-making information for actions such as prevention in children
or particular classes of professionals.
Mechanistic evidence Public health policy needs mechanistic evidence too;
this is provided by analytic epidemiology, which is mainly concerned with ex-
planatory causal hypotheses and answers questions about ‘how’ and ‘why’. Re-
call, the goal of analytic epidemiology is to design studies to test hypotheses
that come from descriptive epidemiology. The scientific literature stresses the
use of measures of associations (e.g., relative risks and odds ratios) and hypoth-
esis testing. However, arguably, this is just half of the story. In fact, measures
of association and hypothesis testing need the underpin of mechanistic evidence
in order to be explanatory (or otherwise they just restate difference-making
evidence).
A good example is provided by the studies on obesity and type 2 diabetes,
more particularly on the mechanisms regulating insulin resistance. Those in-
vestigations are motivated by descriptive studies that reveal neat correlations
between increased numbers of overweight or obese people and numbers of people
affected by diabetes.10
Thus, the role of mechanistic evidence is to provide information about the
causal pathways upon which to intervene. Notice, though, the such pathways
need not be sharply nor only biological. There is in fact substantial investiga-
tions on social determinants and health inequalities in general and for obesity
in particular (see also below ‘ecological’ views of obesity).11
A number of remarks are in order.
First, although there is no ‘conceptual’ priority of one type of evidence over
the other, it is true that different types of evidence may have unequal weights in
assessing different hypotheses of disease causation. For instance, in addressing
the question of what caused the increased obesity prevalence, difference-making
evidence is more important for the ‘fast-food hypothesis’. According to this
hypothesis, the drastic changes in dietary habits, and in particular the increased
consumption of greasy meals prepared in fast food restaurants explains the rapid
7I say ‘part of the job’ and ‘by and large’ because this leads us straight into problems
of external validity, which are far from being settled. For a novel and thought provoking
account of external validity see Steel (2008); for a discussion of the insufficiency of statistics
for external validity, see Cartwright (2010).
8See for instance the National Childhood Obesity Database 2005-2006 (http:
//www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsStatistics/
DH_063565)
9See for instance http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/projects/database.html?prjno=2003305, or
http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/projects/database.html?prjno=2004313.
10See for instance http://ec.europa.eu/research/leaflets/diabetes/index_en.html.
Here is a list of projects funded under the 5th and 6th Framework Programme: http:
//cordis.europa.eu/lifescihealth/major/diabetes-eu-funding.htm.
11See for instance http://ec.europa.eu/health/social_determinants/policy/index_en.
htm.
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increase of obesity in the last fifty years or so. In this case difference-making
evidence—namely about ‘who’ eats ‘what’ and ‘when’—is more important to
pick out the right targets for intervention, as the mechanism is pretty obvious: a
much easier access to food, which is in turn richer in fat than it used to be, makes
people get fat very quickly. On the other hand, when investigating the genetic
hypothesis, mechanistic evidence is the primary focus and difference-making
evidence will play an auxiliary role. According to this hypothesis the main factor
explaining obesity is some particular genetic make up that in turn regulates
insulin resistance. Thus, what is most important is to work out the ‘causal
pathways’, and difference-making evidence may help in singling out similarities
and dissimilarities across different classes of individuals. Therefore, the heavier
weight given to difference-making or mechanistic evidence has to do with the
specific research questions at hand, not with alleged conceptual superiority of
one type of evidence over another.
Second, biological and genetic factors are not enough to explain obesity. Bi-
ological factors alone, including genes playing specific roles in the mechanisms
underlying obesity, do not wholly explain the rise of obesity because it has hap-
pened too quickly in evolutionary terms. Obesity, instead, is arguably the result
of interactions between biology and environment. This thesis is supported, for
instance, by Power and Schulkin (2009). Notably, Power and Schulkin (2009,
p.5) hold that “much of the increase in human obesity is due to a mismatch
between adaptive biological characteristics of our species and the modern envi-
ronment, which has changed dramatically from the one under which we evolved”.
What is put forward is then an ecological view of regulation of food intake:
beside biological and genetic causes, there are also socio-economic causes of
obesity. Before, life was hard and food scarce. Improvements of general living
conditions, including access to food, resulted in more elevated intakes of food,
especially of fats. The switch from agricultural economies to ones based on
manufacturing also meant reduced costs of food and less calories to consume;
also, exercising stops being part of normal working time and is confined to
leisure time. These socio-economic changes explain the cross-sectional and time-
series patterns of obesity better than biological factors, addiction, and cultural
changes (Philipson and Posner, 2008). This is again an example showing that
the available mechanistic evidence supporting the hypothesis of a ‘biological’
increase in obesity is deficient.
Third, the question still looms as to why mechanistic evidence is needed after
all, given that policy makers almost exclusively use information coming from
risks. The answer to this question is that the more detailed the knowledge of
the pathways, the more accurate the decision on what factors to intervene upon.
Public health can hardly intervene on the genetic causes of obesity. Instead,
significant results can be achieved if the patterns of behaviours of different types
of obese people are identified. The MEND programme is again a good example.
They aim to reduce child obesity by targeting families and parents. The key is
to make parents realise that being overweight can cause their children not only
health problems now and in the future, but also unhappiness, lack of confidence,
depression. Thus, MEND appeals to psychological mechanisms (both in obese
children at risk of depression and in the parents worried to avoid such situation)
in order to improve health conditions.
Finally, the thesis that difference-making and mechanistic evidence are typ-
ically needed for causal assessment has the nice consequence that they usually
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help and support each other. This somehow goes against traditional views ac-
cording to which to establish a causal claim different and independent sources
of evidence are needed in order to triangulate. But the ‘tangle’ of difference-
making and mechanistic evidence on the one hand, and of bio-genetic and socio-
economic factors on the other hand exactly mirrors the complexity of disease
causation (on this point, see especially Russo (2011)). Again, the phenomenon
of obesity is exemplar in this respect.
5 Conclusion
Public health aims to preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health
of populations. Evidence-based public health, more specifically, seeks to reach
such goals by means of population-level interventions that are decided on the
basis of the best scientific evidence. Nevertheless, despite all this emphasis on
evidence, what evidence ought to inform public health policy has not received
a satisfactory answer yet. Studies on obesity are paradigmatic as they show
the complexity of the issues behind public health policy and therefore help us
drawing useful lessons about what evidence is needed.
In a nutshell, I defended the idea that public health policies ought to be
informed by two types of evidence, broadly conceived: difference-making and
mechanistic. The argument run in three steps. First, public health policy
strongly relies on findings coming from epidemiology because it provides a
population-level perspective on disease causation. Drawing on other work, I
concluded that causal claims in epidemiology (and in medicine more generally)
are established on the basis of difference-making and mechanistic evidence. Sec-
ond, evidence-based public health heavily relies on evidence assessment but, I
argued, this does not fully answer the question of what evidence backs up public
health policy. Third, I provocatively pleaded for causally-based public health
on the grounds that difference-making evidence supports considerations about
‘what works for whom and in what circumstances’ and that mechanistic evidence
indicates where to intervene in the identified causal pathways.
One objection is that it is common practice to set up public health policies
only on the basis of risks, that is on the basis of difference-making evidence.
Far from urging that action is taken only with full mechanistic knowledge of
the disease, the argument is that better policies can be envisaged if mechanistic
evidence is explicitly taken into account, whenever available.
The advantage of adopting such a view is to have a coherent account where
causal assessment, based on difference-making and mechanistic evidence, con-
tributes to understanding disease and to take action to reduce its burden in
population.
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